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Abstract
We consider a family of exchange economies with complete markets
where consumers have multiprior preferences representing their ambi-
guity aversion. Under a linear independence assumption, we prove
that regular economies are generic. Regular economies exhibit en-
joyable properties: odd finite number of equilibrium prices, local con-
stancy of this number, local differentiable selections of the equilibrium
prices.
Thus, even if ambiguity aversion is represented by non-differentiable
multiprior preferences, economies retain generically the properties of
the differentiable approach.
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sion, multiprior preferences, regular economies, Lipschitz behavior.
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1 Introduction
P Classically, the global analysis of the general economic equilibrium is based
upon well known differential techniques. Basically, one requires the differen-
tiability of the demand functions. We refer the reader to Debreu [11], Mas
Colell [22] and Balasko [1] for more details.
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This differentiability is often derived from well known assumptions on
the utility functions. Indeed, the utility functions are supposed to be C2 to
obtain C1 demand functions. This does not allow the presence of kinks on
indifference curves that arise in uncertainty context.
In the maxmin expected utility model due to Gilboa and Schmeidler
[17], the agents face ambiguity modeled by the multiplicity of the priors of
the agents. Each agent considers the minimum expected utility over his
set of priors. This ”minimum” generates kinks on the indifference curves
when more than one probability realize the minimum, this leads to the non-
differentiability of the demand functions. These kinks cannot be removed
since they are genuinely linked to uncertainty not to modelling issues. The
main objective of this paper is to get the genericity of regular economies
despite that the demand functions are non-differentiable.
In this paper, we consider an exchange economy with a finite number
` of commodities and a finite number m of consumers. The preferences
of consumer i are represented by a utility function ui from R`++ to R. The
function ui is the minimum of a finite number ni of expected utility functions
that satisfy the usual differentiability requirements and a linear independence
assumption on the extremal priors. For example, this linear independence
assumption is satisfied by ε-contamination of confidence.
We first study the properties of the demand functions. This systematic
study constitutes in itself a new result concerning consumers with multiprior
preferences. Indeed, we prove that the demand functions are locally Lipschitz
continuous and that these functions are continuously differentiable on an
open set of full Lebesgue measure.
In the second part of the paper, we follow Balasko’s program. We define
and parametrize the equilibrium manifold. We show that it is indeed a
smooth manifold at almost every point. As in the classical case, we can
propose a global parametrization from which we deduce that the equilibrium
manifold is lipeomorphic1 to an open connected subset of an Euclidean space
denoted by U using similar approach than Bonnisseau and Rivera-Cayupi [5].
We can define an extended projection using the parametrization. This
mapping is continuously differentiable almost everywhere and locally Lips-
chitz continuous.
Contrary to the classical case, we have to take into account the kinks to
define regular economies. A singular economy is either the image of a point
where the extended projection is not differentiable or the image of a point
1Two sets are lipeomorphic if it exists a one-to-one, onto and locally Lipschitz con-
tinuous mapping from the first set to the second one with a locally Lipschitz continuous
inverse.
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where the differential mapping is not onto. A regular economy is, by defi-
nition, an economy that is not singular. By Sard’s theorem since the set U
and the space of economies are two manifolds of same dimension, the set of
singular economies is a set of Lebesgue measure zero2. By the Implicit Func-
tion Theorem, each regular economy has a finite number of equilibria and,
around a regular economy, there exist continuously differentiable selections
of the equilibrium prices.
Computing the degree of the extended projection by an homotopy ar-
gument, we obtain that every regular economy has a finite odd number of
equilibrium prices.
We now mention earlier contributions. Rader [25] showed that, when the
consumers have demand functions almost everywhere differentiable satisfying
property (N): ”The image of a null set is a null set.”, almost every economy
has a finite number of equilibrium prices. In our paper, we prove that Rader’s
properties are satisfied by multiprior preferences but we get more with the
local continuously differentiable selections.
Shannon and Rigotti [26] study market implications of the presence of
ambiguity modelled by variational preferences. Variational preferences en-
compass multiprior preferences. They show that almost all economies are
determinate which means that there exist a finite number of equilibrium
prices and local continuous selections. They obtain also a Lipschitz behavior
in the Choquet case. Note that regularity and determinacy are two distinct
concepts, the first one implying the second one. In particular, the number of
equilibria may not be constant around a determinate economy. We need the
linear independence of Assumption 1 to get regularity instead of determinacy.
In [9], Dana studies agents that are Choquet expected-utility maximizers.
She is interested in equilibrium welfare properties and indeterminacy of the
equilibrium. She provides a sufficient condition on equilibrium implying that
there exists a continuum of equilibrium prices. But, she does not address the
issue of genericity.
In [5], Bonnisseau and Rivera-Cayupi study a non-smooth model although
the failure of differentiability was not in the utility function but on the bound-
ary of the consumption sets. They obtain demand functions with properties
similar to ours.
In Section 2, we present multiprior preferences and the definition of an
equilibrium with complete markets. Actually, to simplify the notation, we
consider a larger class of preferences where the utility functions are defined as
a minimum of a finite family of functions satisfying the usual differentiability
requirements and a linear independence assumption on the gradient vectors.
2Actually, we also use that the image of a null set by a Lipschitz mapping is a null set.
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In Section 3, we study extensively the demand function of a consumer with
multiprior preferences. The fourth section is devoted to the global analysis
of the equilibrium manifold and to the genericity analysis. Some concluding
remarks are given in Section 5 and finally, some technical proofs are given in
Appendix.
2 Multiprior preferences
We3 study a two-period economy with a complete system of markets. There
are two dates t = 0 and t = 1. There is uncertainty at date 0 about which
state will occur at date 1. At date 1, there are S states of nature. We denote
by ∆(S) the set of probabilities on S = {1, . . . , S}. There are I goods at
each node so there are ` := I(1 + S) goods. We model the ambiguity by a
multiplicity of probabilities.
From a general equilibrium point of view, we study a family of economies
parametrized by strictly positive endowments with m consumers and ` com-
modities. We denote respectively by M and L the set of consumers and the
set of commodities. Let M ≡ {1, . . . ,m} and L ≡ {1, . . . , `}.
For each agent i ∈ M , there exists a closed convex set P i ⊂ ∆(S). We
suppose that the set P i has ni extremal points (piki )1≤k≤ni . We also suppose
that the set P i is contained in RS++ to get the strict monotony of preferences.
This can in particular correspond to the convex case of the C.E.U. (Choquet
Expected Utility) model of Schmeidler[28] since the core of a convex capacity
has at most S! extremal points (Shapley [29]).
The agent chooses a contingent consumption vector (xs)1≤s≤S ∈ RIS++ and
a vector x0 ∈ RI++ corresponding to his consumption at date zero. The utility
of the agent i is given by:
ui(x) = bi0(x0) + min
pii∈Pi
S∑
s=1
pii(s)bis(xs) = min
1≤k≤ni
{bi0(x0) +
S∑
s=1
piki (s)bis(xs)}
(2.1)
3Notations. If x is a vector of R`, the norm of the vector x is defined by ‖x‖ :=∑`
h=1 = |xh|. The left-derivative of a function defined on an open interval J ⊂ R at
t ∈ J is denoted by Ψ′l(t). Similarly the right-derivative of Ψ at t is denoted by Ψ′r(t). The
vector 1 denotes the vector of R` that has all coordinates equal to zero. The inner product
of x and y elements of R` is: x · y := ∑`h=1 xhyh. For all r > 0, Bo(a, r) (respectively
Bc(a, r)) denotes the open (resp. closed) ball of center a and of radius r. ]K denotes the
cardinal of the set K. The vectors are, by convention, column vectors and the transpose
of a vector x is denoted by xT .
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where bis : RI++ −→ R are 1 + S functions. We define, for k ∈ {1, . . . , ni},
the function uki by:
uki (x) = bi0(x0) +
S∑
s=1
piki (s)bis(xs) for x ∈ R(1+I)S++ .
In many applications, the function bis does not depend on the state s.
The state-dependent case in the expected utility model has been studied
by Karni, Schmeidler and Vind[19] and Wakker[30] for example. For more
references and a presentation of some applications, see [18].
We posit the following assumption on the probability vectors (piki )1≤k≤ni .
Assumption 1 For every i ∈ M , the probability vectors (piki )1≤k≤ni are lin-
early independent.
Note that this assumption holds true when P i is an ε-contamination of
a probability p¯i. Recall that a set P is called an ε-contamination if: P :=
(1 − ε){p¯i} + ε∆(S) for some real number ε ∈]0; 1[. The extremal points
of P are (1 − ε)p¯i + εpis for s = 1, . . . , S, where pis is the probability such
that pis(s) = 1. Obviously, these vectors are linearly independent. The ε-
contamination of confidence is a special case of the Choquet Expected Utility
model. Indeed, the related capacity ν is defined by:
ν(A) :=
{
(1− ε)p¯i(A) if A 6= S
1 if A = S
and the set P is its core . The weight 1− ε can be interpreted as the degree
of confidence the decision maker has in his prior p¯i. This model has been
axiomatized by Nishimura and Ozaki[24].
The ε-contamination of confidence has the favor of many economists be-
cause it is easier to handle than general multiple prior models. Nishimura
and Ozaki[23] applied this model to search behavior, Chen and Epstein[7] to
portfolio choice, Epstein and Wang[13] to asset pricing and Carlier, Dana and
Shahdi[6] to insurance. For more references, we refer the reader to Nishimura
and Ozaki[24] and Kopylov[20].
Let us now present the assumptions on the functions (bis)
S
s=0.
Assumption 2 For every i ∈M , we assume:
1. ∀s = 0, . . . , S, bis is of class C2,
2. ∀s = 0, . . . , S and all xs ∈ RI++, ∇bis(xs) 0,
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3. ∀s = 0, . . . , S and all xs ∈ RI++, D2bis(xs) is negative definite.
Assumption 3 For every i ∈M , for all s = 0, . . . , S , if a sequence (xν)ν≥0
converges to x¯ ∈ RI+ and x¯h := 0 for some h ∈ {1, . . . , I} then4:
1. limν→+∞ ‖∇bis(xν)‖ = +∞ ,
2.
lim
ν 7−→+∞
∇bis(xν) · xν
‖∇bis(xν)‖ = 0.
Remark 2.1 In the classical one-good case, i.e. I = 1, and in the separable
case5, this assumption can be replaced by the following Inada condition: If
a sequence (xν)ν≥0 converges to x¯ ∈ RI+ and x¯h := 0 for some h ∈ {1, . . . , I}
then: limν→+∞
∂bis(x
ν)
∂xh
= +∞.
The system of markets is complete. Therefore the budget set can be described
by one single constraint with contingent prices at date zero as explained in
the last chapter of Debreu[10]. One can also read Chapter 2 of Magill-
Quinzii[21] for more details about complete and incomplete markets in two-
period economies. The demand fi(p, w) of consumer i with respect to the
price p := (p0, (ps)
S
s=1) ∈ RI(1+S)++ and to his wealth w > 0 is the solution of
the following problem:{
maxui(x)
subject to x 0 and p · x ≤ w (2.2)
In the next definition, we use the simplex normalization, i.e., we take prices in
P with P :=
{
p ∈ R`++ ,
∑`
h=1 ph = 1
}
. We end this section by the definition
of an equilibrium:
Definition 2.1 p ∈ P is an equilibrium price of the economy e = (ei)i∈M if:
m∑
i=1
fis(p, p.ei) =
m∑
i=1
eis for all s = 0, . . . , S.
In this paper, since the preferences of the consumers are fixed, we define
an economy as an element e := (ei)
m
i=1 of (R`++)m. Therefore, the space of
the economies is Ω := (R`++)m.
4Let v ∈ RI . ‖v‖ denotes the norm of the vector v defined by ‖v‖ := ∑Ih=1 |vh|.
5A function b : RI++ → R is said to be separable if there exist I real-valued functions
(ρi)
I
i=1 defined on ]0,+∞[ and I numbers such that: b(x) =
∑I
i=1 βiρi(xi).
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The aim of the paper is to prove that regular economies are generic for
multiprior preferences. Regular economies exhibit enjoyable properties: odd
finite number of equilibrium prices, local constancy of this number, local
differentiable selections of the equilibrium prices.
Thus, even if ambiguity aversion is represented by non-differentiable mul-
tiprior preferences, economies retain generically the properties of the differ-
entiable approach.
Remark 2.2 Balasko[1] showed that the regular economies are generic in the
standard model when the total resources are fixed. This is no more true in our
setting. As an example, let us consider the following multiprior model with
two identical consumers, two states of the nature and two extremal priors.
Formally, P1 = P2 := [pi1, pi2] where: pi1 =
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
and pi2 =
(
1
3
,
2
3
)
. The
Bernoulli function is b(x) = ln(x) so the utility function is defined on R2++
by:
u(x) := min
{
1
2
ln(x1) +
1
2
ln(x2);
1
3
ln(x1) +
2
3
ln(x2)
}
.
The demand function defined on R3++ is:
f(p1, p2, w) =

(
w
2p1
, w
2p2
)
if p2 < p1;(
w
p1+p2
, w
p1+p2
)
if p1 ≤ p2 ≤ 2p1;(
w
3p1
, 2w
3p2
)
if p2 > 2p1.
Suppose that the total resources vector is equal to r = (1, 1). The space of
the economies with total resources equal to r is denoted by Ω(r). For every
economy e ∈ Ω(r), the set of normalized equilibrium prices is:{
(p1, 1− p1) : p1 ∈
[
1
3
,
1
2
]}
The equilibrium allocations of e := ((a, b), (1− a, 1− b)) with a and b posi-
tive are x1 = (p1a+ (1− p1)b, p1a+ (1− p1)b), x2 = (p1(1− a) + (1− p1)(1−
b), (p1(1−a)+(1−p1)(1−b)) for p1 ∈ [13 , 12 ]. So all the economies are singular
in Ω(r).
A larger class of preferences
To simplify the notations, we consider a larger class of preferences and
prove that the aforementioned properties are satisfied for this class of prefer-
ences. Namely, we prove the genericity of regular economies and obtain the
classical properties of these economies.
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We assume that the preferences of consumer i ∈M are represented by a
utility function ui from R`++ to R which is the minimum of ni functions:
ui = min{u1i , u2i , . . . , unii }
with ni ∈ N∗. We state the following assumptions on the utility functions.
Assumption 4 For all i ∈M , for all k ∈ {1, .., ni},
1. uki is C
2 on R`++,
2. D2uki (x) is negative definite on ∇uki (x)⊥ for all x ∈ R`++,
3. uki satisfy ∇uki (x) 0 for all x ∈ R`++.
For all x ∈ R`++, Mi(x) denotes the set of the indices of the functions
realizing the minimum, i.e. Mi(x) := {k ∈ {1, . . . , ni} : uki (x) = ui(x)}.
Assumption 5 For all i ∈M , for all x ∈ R`++, the vectors (∇uki (x))k∈Mi(x)
are linearly independent.
Assumption 6 For all i ∈M , for all k ∈ {1, . . . , ni}, if a sequence (xνi )ν≥0
converges to xi ∈ ∂R`++ then:
lim
ν 7−→+∞
∇uki (xνi ) · xνi
‖∇uki (xνi )‖
= 0.
Remark 2.3 Assumption 4 tells us that the preferences are continuous,
monotone and strictly convex. Moreover, each commodity is desirable.
For i ∈ M and k ∈ {1, . . . , ni}, Assumption 6 on the function uki is
weaker than the usual assumption: for all x ∈ R`++, the closure in R` of
the set {x′ ∈ R`++|uki (x′) ≥ uki (x)} is contained in R`++. The usual closure
assumption implies Assumption 6 but both assumptions are not equivalent.
For instance, the function u defined on R2++ by: u(x1, x2) =
√
x1 +
√
x2
satisfies Assumption 6 but not the classical assumption6.
The next proposition shows that the multiprior preferences satisfy As-
sumptions 4, 5 and 6.
Proposition 2.1 Let i ∈ M . Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the corre-
sponding family of functions (uki )1≤k≤ni satisfies Assumption 4, 5 and 6.
The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix.
6Take x¯ :=
(
1
4
,
1
4
)
and
(
xν :=
(
1 +
1
ν
,
1
ν
))
ν≥1
as a counterexample.
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3 Properties of the individual demand
In this section, we study the individual demand fi(p, w) of consumer i ∈ M
defined as the solution of the program:{
maxui(x)
subject to x 0 and p · x ≤ w (3.1)
where w ∈]0,+∞[ and p ∈ R`++. Let us present the main result of the section:
Proposition 3.1 Under Assumptions 4, 5 and 6, fi(p, w) is a singleton for
all i ∈ M , p ∈ R`++ and w > 0. The function fi is locally Lipschitz con-
tinuous on R`++×]0,+∞[. Furthermore, there exists an open subset Ω0i in
R`++×]0,+∞[ of full Lebesgue measure on which fi is C1.
We first sketch the proof. To simplify the notation, we skip the index i
during the proof and denote the function uki by u
k. In Lemma 6.1, we es-
tablish the continuity of f as a consequence of Berge’s Theorem. Then,
in Lemma 6.3, we obtain that this function is locally Lipschitz continu-
ous thanks to Cornet-Vial[8]. Thanks to Rademacher’s Theorem, f is dif-
ferentiable on a set Ω˜ that has full Lebesgue measure. Following Fiacco-
McCormick[15], we prove in Lemma 6.4 that the function f is continuously
differentiable around (p¯, w¯) whenever the strict complementarity slackness is
satisfied at (p¯, w¯) for the optimization problem related to the demand. To
conclude, in Lemma 3.1, we show that the function f is not differentiable at
(p¯, w¯) when the strict complementarity slackness is not satisfied.
More precisely, let us rewrite the optimization problem defining the de-
mand. As explained above, the function u is not differentiable a priori.
Therefore Problem 3.1 is not in standard form. Considering this, we rewrite
this problem in a standard form where the functions at stake are twice contin-
uously differentiable. To do so, we remark that, for all (p, w) ∈ R`++×]0,+∞[,
f(p, w) is the solution of the following problem:
min−t
subject to
t− uk(x) ≤ 0, k = 1, . . . , n
p · x− w ≤ 0
x 0
(3.2)
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The first order conditions related to this problem are the following: there
exists λ ∈ Rn+1+ such that
t− uk(x) ≤ 0, λk(t− uk(x)) = 0, k = 1, . . . , n
p · x− w ≤ 0, λn+1(p · x− w) = 0
n∑
k=1
λk = 1
λn+1 p =
n∑
k=1
λk∇uk(x)
(3.3)
Note that this maximization problem is not necessarily convex since the
constraint t − uk(x) may not be quasi-convex. Nevertheless, the first order
conditions are necessary since the Mangasarian-Fromovitz qualification con-
dition is satisfied and sufficient as shown in Appendix. Furthermore, the
linear independence Assumption 5 implies that the multiplier is unique.
Now, let Ω0 defined by:
Ω0 :=
{
(p, w) ∈ R`++×]0; +∞[ ∀k ∈M(f(p, w)), λk(p, w) > 0
}
We prove that the set Ω0 is an open set on which the function f is contin-
uously differentiable by Lemma 6.4 and that the set of differentiability points
of Ω˜ has full Lebesgue measure thanks to Lemma 6.3 and Rademacher’s The-
orem. In Lemma 3.1, we show that the function f is not differentiable at
any point outside Ω0 which means Ω˜ = Ω0. Therefore we conclude that f is
continuously differentiable on an open set of full Lebesgue measure. Lemma
3.1 constitutes the keystep of the proof and is obtained reasoning by contra-
diction. We construct a price path t 7→ p(t) with p(t) = p¯ and show that
the function t 7→ uk[f(p(t), p(t) · f(p¯, w¯))] is not differentiable at zero for any
k ∈M(f(p¯, w¯)) such that the corresponding multiplier is equal to zero.
All we have to prove is the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.1 If (p¯, w¯) /∈ Ω0 then the function f is not differentiable at (p¯, w¯).
Let (p¯, w¯) /∈ Ω0. For the remaining of the section, we write: x¯ := f(p¯, w¯)
and λ¯k := λk(p¯, w¯) for k ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1}. Since the strict complementarity
slackness condition does not hold, M(f(p¯, w¯)) can be decomposed the follow-
ing way: M(f(p¯, w¯)) = K ∪K ′ with K and K ′ subsets of {1, . . . , n}, λ¯k > 0
for k ∈ K, λ¯k = 0 for k ∈ K ′ and K ′ 6= ∅. Note that we have: K 6= ∅ since
p¯ 6= 0 and ∑k∈K λ¯k = 1 since ∑K∪K′ λ¯k = 1 and λ¯k = 0 for every k ∈ K ′.
We define the function f¯ on R`++ by: f¯(p) := f(p, p · x¯).
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In the proof of Lemma 3.1, we use some auxiliary functions that we
introduce now. We define a generalized Hicksian demand ∆K and a demand
function fK both related to the functions (uk)k∈K . Based on fK , we also
define the functions f¯K and vˆK .
A generalized Hicksian demand and the related expenditure function:
Let v¯K = (v¯
k)k∈K := (uk(x¯))k∈K . For p ∈ R`++ and vK = (vk)k∈K ∈ RK ,
let ∆K(p, (v
k)k∈K) be the solution7 of the problem:
min p · x
subject to uk(x) ≥ vk ∀k ∈ K
x 0
(3.4)
The related expenditure function is defined by:
eK(p, vK) := p ·∆K(p, vK).
The map ∆K has been extensively studied in [4]. This map is continu-
ously differentiable with respect to (p, v) around the point (p¯, v¯K) since the
multipliers related to the satiated constraints are positive and the gradients
(∇uk(x¯))k∈K are linearly independent which holds true thanks to Assumption
5.
Note also that ∆K(p¯, v¯K) = x¯. Indeed the necessary and sufficient first
order conditions are satisfied by x¯. Moreover, all the constraints are satiated
and have positive related multipliers.
Like the classical expenditure function, the function eK is concave with
respect to p so almost everywhere twice differentiable and satisfies D2peK =
Dp∆K whenever this expression makes sense
8.
The next lemma is a generalization of a well known result about the
Slutsky matrix.
Lemma 3.2 The matrix Dp∆K(p¯, v¯) has rank ` − ]K and its kernel is the
linear space L (∇uk(x¯) , k ∈ K) spanned by the family (∇uk(x¯))
k∈K.
This result is proved in Appendix.
An auxiliary demand function:
7In [4], it is proved that this solution exists and is unique for (p, vK) in a neighborhood
of (p¯, v¯K).
8See [4].
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We define the demand function fK related to the utility functions (u
k)k∈K .
fK(p, w) is the solution of the optimization problem:
min−t
subject to
t− uk(x) ≤ 0 k ∈ K
p · x− w ≤ 0
x 0
(3.5)
Note that we have: fK(p¯, w¯) = x¯ = f(p¯, w¯) since the necessary and sufficient
first order conditions are satisfied by x¯. Indeed, we have: λ¯k = 0 for all
k ∈ K ′. The function fK is continuously differentiable around (p¯, w¯) since
all the multipliers are positive. See Lemma 6.4.
We define on R`++ the function f¯K by: f¯K(p) = fK(p, p·x¯). We also define
the function vˆK from R`++ to RK by vˆK(p) = (vˆkK(p) = uk[f¯K(p)])k∈K . Note
that, for (k, k′) ∈ K2, vˆkK(p) = vˆk′K(p) in a neighborhood of p¯. Indeed, from
the necessary and sufficient first order conditions, f¯K(p) = ∆K(p, vˆK(p)) for p
close enough to p¯ because the function vˆK and the multipliers corresponding
to Problem 3.5 are continuous9 and the multipliers are all positive at (p¯, v¯K).
To conclude, we point out the following facts:
• x¯ = ∆K(p¯, v¯K) = fK(p¯, w¯),
• for p close enough to p¯, we have: f¯K(p) = ∆K(p, vˆK(p)),
• The functions fK , f¯K , ∆K and vˆK are continuously differentiable re-
spectively locally around (p¯, w¯), p¯, (p¯, v¯) and p¯.
The following result relates the partial derivative with respect to p of the
compensated demand ∆K and the differential of the demand f¯K at the price
p¯ and provides an important result concerning the functions (vˆkK)k∈K .
Lemma 3.3 For all k ∈ K, ∇vˆkK(p¯) = 0. Moreover we have:
Df¯K(p¯) = Dp∆K(p¯, v¯K).
The proof is given in Appendix.
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Recall that we have: M(f(p¯, w¯)) = K ∪ K ′ with K and K ′ subsets of
{1, . . . , n} and that λ¯k > 0 for k ∈ K and λ¯k = 0 for k ∈ K ′.
We now consider a particular price path p(.) to get the desired result.
Let E be the vector space spanned by the family
(∇uk(x¯))
k∈K′ and Φ :=
9This is a consequence of Lemma 6.3.
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Dp∆K(p¯, v¯). From Lemma 3.2, the matrix Dp∆K(p¯, v¯) is negative semi-
definite on R` and KerDp∆K(p¯, v¯) = L
(∇uk(x¯) , k ∈ K). On the other
hand, the family (∇uk(x¯))k∈K∪K′ is linearly independent from Assumption 5.
Hence Dp∆K(p¯, v¯) is negative definite on E since KerDp∆K(p¯, v¯)∩E = {0}.
Thanks to Proposition 6.1, there exists (αk)k∈K′ in RK
′
++ such that, for all
k′ ∈ K ′,
∇uk′(x¯) ·Dp∆K(p¯, v¯)
(∑
k∈K′
αk∇uk(x¯)
)
< 0. (3.6)
For all t ∈ J :=]− a, a[10, let :
p(t) :=
1
λ¯n+1
[∑
k∈K
λ¯k∇uk(x¯) + t
(∑
k∈K′
αk∇uk(x¯)
)]
. (3.7)
For k ∈ K, we introduce the function defined on J by: v˜k(t) := vˆk(p(t)) =
uk[f¯K(p(t))]. For k ∈ K ′, we define the functions ϕk and ϕ˜k on J by: ϕk(t) :=
uk[f¯(p(t))] and ϕ˜k(t) := uk[f¯K(p(t))]
11. As a preliminary remark, we see that
the functions (ϕ˜k)k∈K′ and (v˜k)k∈K are differentiable on a neighborhood of
zero. Indeed, the functions (uk)nk=1 are differentiable, the function f¯K is
differentiable around p¯, p(0) = p¯ and p(.) is a differentiable path on J .
Claim 3.1 If t > 0 is small enough, f¯(p(t)) = f(p(t), p(t) · x¯) = x¯ so the
right-derivative (ϕk)′r(0) is equal to zero for all k ∈ K ′.
Proof of Claim 3.1 For t > 0 small enough, thanks to the formula 3.7, one
remarks that x¯ satisfies the necessary and sufficient first order conditions
related to the problem: 
maxu(x)
s.t. x 0
p(t) · x ≤ p(t) · x¯
with the related multipliers
λ¯k∑
κ∈K λ¯κ + t(
∑
κ∈K′ ακ)
for k ∈ K, tαk∑
κ∈K λ¯κ + t(
∑
κ∈K′ ακ)
for k ∈ K ′,
10The number a is a positive number sufficiently small to ensure that p(t) belongs to
R`++ for all t ∈ J .
11To avoid any confusion, we denote with“ϕ”s the functions for k ∈ K ′ and with“v”s
the functions for k ∈ K.
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0 for k /∈ M(x¯) ∪ {n + 1} and λ¯n+1∑
κ∈K λ¯κ + t(
∑
κ∈K′ ακ)
for the budget con-
straint12. Therefore we can conclude that x¯ is a solution of the problem, that
is: f(p(t), p(t) · x¯) = f¯(p(t)) = x¯. 
From Lemma 3.3 and the choice of the family (αk)k∈K′ , we obtain the
following claim:
Claim 3.2 For all k ∈ K ′, we have:
(ϕ˜k)′(0) < 0.
Proof of Claim 3.2 By the chain rule, Lemma 3.3 and Equation (3.6), we
have for k ∈ K ′:
(ϕ˜k)′(0) = ∇uk(x¯) ·Df¯K(p¯)
(∑
κ∈K′ ακ∇uκ(x¯)
)
= ∇uk(x¯) ·Dp∆K(p¯, v¯K)
(∑
κ∈K′ ακ∇uκ(x¯)
)
< 0.

Now we consider the last claim.
Claim 3.3 f¯K(p(t)) = f¯(p(t)) for t < 0 sufficiently near from zero. Conse-
quently, the left-derivative (ϕk)′l(0) is negative for every k ∈ K ′.
Proof of Claim 3.3 We first say that the constraints corresponding to k ∈
{1, . . . , n} \M(f(p, w)) are inactive for t < 0 sufficiently small by continuity
of the functions at stake. Summarizing what we obtained before, we have:
• (v˜k)′(0) = 0 for k ∈ K(Lemma 3.3),
• (ϕ˜k)′(0) < 0 for k ∈ K ′(Claim 3.2),
• v˜k(0) = (ϕ˜k)′(0) for (k, k′) ∈ K ×K ′.
The last equality comes from the following equalities:
p(0) = p¯, fK(p¯, w¯) = fK(p¯, p¯ · x¯) = f(p¯, w¯) = x¯
and uk(x¯) = uk
′
(x¯) for all (k, k′) ∈ K ×K ′.
From these three facts, we get: (ϕ˜k)
′(t) > vˆk(t) for all (k, k′) ∈ K ×K ′
and t < 0 sufficiently near from zero. Therefore f¯K(p(t)) is feasible for t
close enough to zero for Problem 3.2 defining the demand f(p(t), p(t) · x¯). It
satisfies the necessary and sufficient first order conditions and the multipliers
12 See Equation 6.3.
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are given by the multipliers related to Problem 3.5 completed by zeroes for
k ∈ K ′ and k /∈ M [f(p¯, w¯)]. Since f¯K(p(t)) = f¯(p(t)) for t < 0 close enough
to zero, we have ϕk(t) = ϕ˜k(t) for t < 0 close enough to zero for all k ∈ K ′.
We conclude: (ϕk)′l(0) < 0 for every k ∈ K ′ by Claim 3.2. 
Finally, for every k ∈ K ′, from Claim 3.3, the left derivative of ϕk at 0 is
negative while the right derivative of ϕk at 0 is equal to zero by Claim 3.1.
Therefore the functions (ϕk)k∈K′ are not differentiable at zero, which implies
that the function f is not differentiable at (p¯, w¯).
4 The equilibrium manifold
In this section, we study the equilibrium price vectors from a global point
of view following Balasko [1]. The monotony of the utility functions implies
that the equilibrium prices are always strictly positive. Moreover they are
defined up to a normalization. We use the simplex normalization, i.e., we
take prices in S with S :=
{
p ∈ R`++ ,
∑`
h=1 ph = 1
}
. We now define the
equilibrium manifold and the natural projection.
Definition 4.1 (i) p ∈ S is an equilibrium price of the economy e = (ei)i∈M
if:
m∑
i=1
fi(p, p.ei) =
m∑
i=1
ei.
(ii) The equilibrium manifold Eeq is the set of the pairs (p, e) ∈ S × Ω with
p equilibrium price for the economy e. An element (p, e) of the set Eeq is
called an equilibrium point.
In our framework, the equilibrium manifold13 is not necessarily smooth
and we cannot directly apply the classical arguments of differential topology.
Nevertheless, we parametrize the equilibrium manifold and exploit the results
of the previous section.
We recall that 1 denotes the vector whose coordinates are all equal to
1 and by 1⊥ the vector space orthogonal to the vector 1. We define the
mapping θ2 from X = S × Rm++ × (1⊥)m−1 to (R`)m as follows: for ξ =
(p, (wi)
m
i=1, (ηi)
m−1
i=1 ),{
θ2i (ξ) := ηi + (wi − p · ηi)1 ∀i = 1, . . . ,m− 1
θ2m(ξ) := fm(p, wm) +
∑m−1
i=1 (fi(p, wi)− θ2i (ξ))
(4.1)
13We prove that it is indeed a smooth manifold at almost every point.
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Let us define the set U by
U := {ξ ∈ X | θ2(ξ) ∈ (R`++)m} .
Now we define the subset V of U , as follows: an element (p, (wi)mi=1, (ηi)m−1i=1 )
of U belongs to V if and only if (p, wi) belongs to Ω0i for all i = 1, . . . ,m, Ω0i
being given by Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 4.1 The set U is an open connected subset of S×Rm×(1⊥)m−1.
Proof The set U is clearly open in S × Rm × (1⊥)m−1 as θ2 is continuous.
For the remaining of the proof, we will use extensively the following result.
For all x ∈ R` and all p ∈ S, we have:
x = proj1⊥x+ (p · x− p · proj1⊥x)1. (4.2)
We show that the set U is arcconnected. Let ξk := (pk, (wki )mi=1, (ηki )m−1i=1 ),
k = 1, 2, two elements of U . Our goal is to connect ξ1 to ξ2. We introduce
two intermediate points: χk := (pk, (wki )
m
i=1, (proj1⊥fi(p
k, wki ))
m−1
i=1 ), k = 1, 2.
We show that we can construct a continuous path between ξk and χk,
k = 1, 2 and another one between χ1 and χ2, theses paths taking values in
U which gives us the result. We first remark that Formula 4.2 implies that
θ2(χk) = (fi(p
k, wki ))
m
i=1 for k = 1, 2.
Paths between ξk and χk
For k = 1, 2, for all t ∈ [0, 1], let ζkt := (1 − t)ξk + tχk. This defines
a continuous path between ξk and χk. ζkt belongs to U for all t since θ2 is
linear with respect to the variables (ηi)
m−1
i=1 and (R`++)m is convex.
Path between χ1 and χ2
For all t ∈ [0, 1], we define pt := (1− t)p1 + tp2 and wti := (1− t)w1i + tw2i
for all i = 1, . . . ,m. The vector χt+1 := (pt, (wti)
m
i=1, (proj1⊥fi(p
t, wti))
m−1
i=1 )
defines a continuous path between χ1 and χ2 thanks to the continuity of
the demand functions and belongs to U since θ2(χt+1) = (fi(pt, wti))mi=1 ∈
(R`++)m.
We conclude that the set U is arcconnected.
Now, we introduce the map θ from U to Eeq to parametrize the equilib-
rium manifold. For ξ = (p, (wi)
m
i=1, (ηi)
m−1
i=1 ) ∈ U ,
θ(ξ) =
(
p, θ2(ξ)
)
. (4.3)
Note that the range of the map θ is contained in Eeq. Let ei = θ
2
i (ξ).
From the formula defining θ2, one has p · ei = wi, from the definition of U ,
ei  0 for all i in M and from the formula for θ2m,
∑m
i=1 fi(p, p ·ei) =
∑m
i=1 ei.
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The other map that we consider is the following:
φ : Eeq −→ U
(p, (ei)
m
i=1) 7−→ (p, (p.ei)mi=1, (proj1⊥ei)m−1i=1 ).
(4.4)
Note that the range of the map φ is contained in U . Indeed, from Formula
4.2, θ2(p, (p · ei)mi=1, (proj1⊥ei)m−1i=1 ) = (ei)mi=1 belongs to (R`++)m.
We now state the properties of θ and φ, which imply that Eeq is a manifold
parametrized by θ.
Proposition 4.2
1. The maps θ and φ are one-to-one, onto and θ−1 = φ.
2. The maps θ and φ are locally Lipschitz and continuous.
3. The set U \ V is closed in U and has Lebesgue measure zero.
4. θ is continuously differentiable on V.
5. Eeq is lipeomorphic to U .
Proof The proof is based on the properties of the demand functions.
1. As already noticed above, from Formula 4.2, for all (p, (ei)
m
i=1) ∈ Eeq,
θ ◦ φ(p, (ei)mi=1) = (p, (ei)mi=1).
Conversely, for all ξ = (p, (wi)
m
i=1, (ηi)
m−1
i=1 ) ∈ U , the definition of θ2 and
Walras law imply that p · θ2i (ξ) = wi for i = 1, . . . ,m, and proj1⊥θ2i (ξ) = ηi
for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1. So, φ ◦ θ(ξ) = ξ.
Hence, φ = θ−1 and φ and θ are one-to-one and onto.
2. θ and φ are locally Lipschitz and continuous since the demand functions
fi are so.
3. Since the set (S×R)\Ω0i ∩ (S×R) is a closed set of Lebesgue measure
zero for each i ∈ M , the set U \ V is closed in U and has Lebesgue measure
zero from Fubini’s Theorem.
4. The map θ is C1 on V from the definition of V and the properties of
the demand function fi on Ω
0
i .
5. This is a consequence of 1. and 2.
Following Balasko [1], let us introduce the natural projection as well as
the extended projection.
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Definition 4.2 (The natural projection) The natural projection pi is the
map from Eeq to Ω defined by:
pi :
Eeq −→ Ω
(p, e) 7−→ e (4.5)
The map Π := pi ◦ θ is called the extended projection.
Π : U −→ Ω is defined by: Π(p, (wi)mi=1, (ηi)m−1i=1 ) := θ2(p, (wi)mi=1, (ηi)m−1i=1 ).
Proposition 4.3 The mapping Π is proper, locally Lipschitz continuous.
Moreover the mapping Π is continuously differentiable on V. Π(U \ V) is
closed and has Lebesgue measure zero in Ω.
Proof The mapping Π is locally Lipschitz continuous and continuously dif-
ferentiable on the set V by the properties of θ. The properness of Π is a
particular case of the properness of F , the proof of which is given below as
part of the proof of Theorem 4.3.
The set Π(U \ V) is closed in Ω because the set U \ V is closed in U and
the map Π is proper on U . The set Π(U \ V) has Lebesgue measure zero
because the map Π is locally Lipschitz continuous14 and the set U \ V is a
null set. 
There are different concepts of regularity for non-smooth mappings. In
this paper, a regular point is a point where the mapping is differentiable
and the differential mapping is onto. A value is regular if all pre-images are
regular points. A value is singular if it is not regular.
Definition 4.3 The economy e := (ei)i∈M is called regular if e /∈ Π(U \ V)
and if the differential of Π at all the pre-images of e is onto. An economy
which is not regular is called singular. Er denotes the set of regular economies
and Es the set of singular economies.
The following result is the extension of one of the cornerstones of the
differentiable approach of general equilibrium theory.
Theorem 4.1 The set of regular economies Er is an open dense subset of
Ω of full Lebesgue measure.
Proof Er is open and has full Lebesgue measure. We have already seen that
Π(U \ V) is a closed null set. The set of the critical points of Π|V is closed in
V , hence this set has the form V ∩ C where C is a set closed in U . Remark
14The image of a null set by a locally Lipschitz map is a null set. See Federer [14].
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that we have the equalities: Es = Π(C ∩ V) ∪Π(U \ V) = Π(C) ∪Π(U \ V).
We deduce that the set Es is a closed set since the map Π is proper. This
set has Lebesgue measure zero by Sard’s Theorem and the previous theorem.
Hence, Er is an open set of full Lebesgue measure.
Er is dense. Indeed, the set Es is a set of Lebesgue measure zero, so its
complement Er is dense. 
The following result summarizes the properties of regular economies. It
is a direct consequence of the Implicit Function Theorem.
Theorem 4.2
1. For e ∈ Er, there exists a finite number n of equilibrium prices.
2. For e ∈ Er, there exists an open neighborhood U ⊂ Er of e such that
the inverse image of U is the union of a finite number of pairwise
disjoint subsets (Vk)
n
k=1 of V and such that the restriction of Π to Vk is
a diffeomorphism for all k = 1, . . . , n.
3. For e ∈ Er, there exist an open neighborhood U ⊂ Er of e and a finite
number n of continuously differentiable maps sk : U −→ S such that the
union ∪nk=1sk(e′) is the set of equilibrium price vectors of the economy
e′ ∈ U .
Remark 4.1 Note that, around a regular economy e, the number of equi-
librium prices is constant by the previous theorem.
We now turn ourselves to the computation of the degree of Π. We first
remark that the mapping Π is not continuously differentiable. So we cannot
use the classical definition of the degree. Therefore we consider the degree
for continuous mappings15. Since the set U is unbounded, the definition of
the degree needs some properness assumption16.
Theorem 4.3
1. The map Π is of degree one and onto.
2. For all e ∈ Ω, there exists an equilibrium.
3. For all e ∈ Er, there exists a finite odd number of equilibrium prices.
15A good reference is Deimling [12] for example.
16See Deimling [12] p.27.
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Proof We consider the extended projection Π1 corresponding to consumers
having as utility functions the functions u1i .
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The map18 F from S × Rm++ × (1⊥)m−1 × [0, 1] to R`m is defined for all
(ξ, t) = ((p, (wi)
m
i=1, (ηi)
m−1
i=1 ), t) ∈ S× Rm++ × (1⊥)m−1 × [0, 1] by:
F (ξ, t) := tΠ(ξ) + (1− t)Π1(ξ).
We first show that the inverse image of every compact subset K of Ω is a
compact subset of S × Rm++ × (1⊥)m−1 × [0, 1]. Let us consider a sequence(
ξν :=
(
pν , (wνi )
m
i=1, (η
ν
i )
m−1
i=1
)
, tν
)
ν≥0 of F
−1(K). We denote by (eν)ν≥0 the
sequence of K defined by eν := F (ξν , tν) for ν ≥ 0. The sequence (ξν , tν)ν≥0
remains in a compact set of S¯×Rm × (1⊥)m−1 × [0, 1]. Indeed, the first and
the last components lie in a compact set by definition. Moreover, the set
A := {(p · ei)mi=1|(ei)mi=1 ∈ K , p ∈ S¯} is a compact set. Since p ∈ S¯ and since
the set K is contained in Ω, every element a ∈ A is positive i.e. a ∈ Rm++.
By Walras law and the definition of F , wνi = p
ν · eνi for all i = 1, . . . ,m and
all ν ≥ 0. Hence, the sequence ((wνi )mi=1)ν≥0 lies in the compact set A.
The compactness of the set K and the continuity of the projection map
imply that the sequence (ηνi := proj1⊥e
ν
i )ν≥0 lies in a compact subset of 1
⊥.
To conclude, up to a subsequence, the sequence (ξν , tν)ν≥0 converges to a
vector (ξ¯ := (p¯, (w¯i)
m
i=1, (η¯i)
m−1
i=1 ), t¯) ∈ S¯×Rm× (1⊥)m−1× [0, 1]. Remark that
(w¯i)
m
i=1 belongs to A so the real number w¯i is positive for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
Now, we have to prove that this vector belongs to F−1(K). Thanks to
the continuity of F and to the closedness of K, it suffices to prove that the
price p¯ belongs to S. By definition of F , Π and Π1, the m-th component
of F , Fm(ξ
ν , tν) is equal to (1 − tν)[f 1m(pν , wνm) +
∑m−1
i=1 (f
1
i (p
ν , wνi ) − eνi )] +
tν [fm(p
ν , wνm) +
∑m−1
i=1 (fi(p
ν , wνi )− eνi )] for ν ≥ 0.
We first remark that, for all i = 1, . . . ,m, (eνi )ν≥0 is bounded since (e
ν)ν≥0
belongs to the compact set K. We also remark that fi(pν , wνi ) and f 1i (pν , wνi )
are positive. If (pν)ν≥0 converged to p¯ in ∂S and (wνi )i∈M,ν≥0 converged to
some element (w¯i)i∈M ∈ Rm++ then ‖f 1i (pν , wνi )‖ and ‖fi(pν , wνi )‖ would go
to +∞ as ν goes to infinity for all i ∈ M by monotony of the functions
(ui)i∈M and (u1i )i∈M . So ‖Fm(ξν , tν)‖ would go to +∞, which contradicts
that F (ξν , tν) belongs to the compact set K for all ν ≥ 0.
17As it can be easily understood, the definitions of Π1, f1i and θ
1 are analogous to those
of Π, fi and θ. The main difference is that those maps are smooth.
18By a slight abuse of notation, we denote by Π and Π1 the extensions of those maps
to X whereas they were originally defined on U ⊂ X . Both are defined with the same
formulas as Π (respectively Π1). Nevertheless, note that these extensions are not proper,
that is why we only consider here the inverse images of compact subsets of Ω. At the end,
we obtain the existence of an equilibrium only for positive endowments.
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Since Ω is connected, the degree does not depend on the choice of the
element where it is computed. Let e¯ ∈ Ω defined, for i ∈M , by e¯i := f 1i (p, wi)
for some (p, (wi)
m
i=1) ∈ S× Rm++. Let B¯ := Bc(e¯, r) be a closed ball of center
e¯ contained in Ω19 and B := Bo(e¯, r) the open ball of same center and same
radius. We know that the set F−1(B¯) is a compact set. The set F−1(B)
contains F−1({e¯}) and is an open set, by the continuity of F , contained in
F−1(B¯). Hence F−1({e¯}) is contained in the interior of F−1(B¯).
We now define the set ϑ := projS×Rm++×(1⊥)m−1F
−1(B). This set is an open
set20. The mapping F is obviously continuous on ϑ¯ × [0, 1]. Let Fˆ be the
restriction of F to ϑ¯ × [0, 1]. From Balasko[1], the degree modulo 2 at e¯ of
F0 is equal to 1
21. Since F−10 ({e¯}) is contained in ϑ, the degree of Fˆ0 is also
equal to the degree of F0 by Property (d2) of the degree (See Deimling [12].).
The degree of Fˆ1 at e¯ is also equal to 1 since Fˆ is a continuous homotopy.
Since F−11 ({e¯}) is contained in ϑ, the degree of Π at e¯ is equal to the degree
of Fˆ1. In conclusion, the degree of Π is equal to 1.
Hence, for all e ∈ Ω, Π−1({e}) 6= ∅, which means that there exists an
equilibrium for every economy e ∈ Ω. The third point is a consequence of
the fact that Π is locally C1 around all the pre-images of a regular economy
using that the degree of Π is equal to 1. 
5 Concluding remarks
This paper provides a contribution in the analysis of the individual behavior
and in the global analysis of the equilibrium with multiprior preferences.
The first main result is that, under an assumption of linear independence of
the priors, the demand of a consumer with multiprior preferences is locally
Lipschitz and continuously differentiable on an open set of full Lebesgue
measure. Using Rader [25] and this result, we derive that almost every
economy has a finite number of equilibrium prices.
The second main result concerns the genericity of regular economies. We
have recovered the usual results of the global analysis of economic equilibrium
from a differentiable viewpoint. Beyond most of the previous contributions in
non-smooth cases, we have obtained not only that almost every economy has
a finite number of equilibrium prices but that there exists an open set of full
Lebesgue measure on which the result holds true. Moreover, we have proven
that the equilibrium price selections are continuously differentiable. Further-
more, regular economies enjoy good properties like the local constancy of the
19The radius r has to be sufficiently small.
20The image of an open set by a projection map is open.
21See [1] pp 103-106.
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number of equilibrium prices.
The only restriction is the requirement of linear independence of the gra-
dients. First note that this requirement is easy to check. Then, remark that
this requirement is always satisfied when the agents have at most two “ex-
tremal” priors. It remains open to study cases where not all but just some
of the “extremal” priors are linearly independent.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1 The assumptions on the functions bis imply
straightforwardly that the functions (uki )1≤k≤ni satisfy Assumption 4.
Let us prove that Assumption 5 is satisfied. Let x¯ ∈ R`++.
If
∑
k∈M(x¯) γk∇uki (x¯) = 0 for some (γk)k∈M(x¯), then, for all s ∈ {1, . . . , S}, ∑
k∈M(x¯)
γkpi
k
i (s)
∇bis(x¯s) = 0
and for s = 0,  ∑
k∈M(x¯)
γk
∇bi0(x¯0) = 0.
Since ∇bis(x¯s)  0 for all s = 0, . . . , S by Assumption 2, we get for s ∈
{1, . . . , S}: ∑
k∈M(x¯)
γkpi
k
i (s) = 0
By the linear independence of the probability vectors (piki )
n
k=1, we conclude
that γk = 0 for k ∈ M(x¯). Hence, the gradient vectors (∇uki (x¯))k∈M(x¯) are
linearly independent. So, the functions (uki )1≤k≤ni satisfy Assumption 5.
By simple computation, Assumption 3 implies that Assumption 6 is sat-
isfied. 
Details of the proof of Proposition 3.1 Let us summarize what fol-
lows. First we present the first order conditions characterizing the demand
f(p, w). Then, we consider a compact neighborhood Ξ of an arbitrary ele-
ment (p¯, w¯) ∈ R`++×]0,+∞[. We define a ε-budget set and also a demand
function f ε corresponding to this budget set. We show that this demand
function is singled valued and continuous on Ξ. Thirdly, we show that for
some ε¯ > 0, f ε¯(p, w) satisfies the first order conditions characterizing f(p, w)
for every (p, w) ∈ Ξ. We conclude that f(p, w) is a singleton for every
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(p, w) ∈ R`++×]0,+∞[ and that f is continuous on R`++×]0,+∞[ in Lemma
6.1. Finally, we show that f is locally Lipschitz on R`++×]0,+∞[ in Lemma
6.3. In Lemma 6.4, we show that the function f is continuously differentiable
locally around (p¯, w¯) ∈ Ω0.
First order characterization of Problem 3.2.
f(p, w) is the solution of the problem:
min−t
subject to
t− uk(x) ≤ 0 k = 1, . . . , n
p · x− w ≤ 0
x 0
(6.1)
Let us introduce the functions τ : R× R`++ × R`++×]0,+∞[−→ R and
g : R× R`++ × R`++×]0,+∞[−→ Rn+1 defined by:
• τ(t, x, p, w) := −t,
• gk(t, x, p, w) := t− uk(x) for k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
• gn+1(t, x, p, w) := p · x− w.
(t, x) are the variables and (p, w) the parameters. The gradients and the
Hessian matrix with respect to (t, x) are given for all (t, x, p, w) ∈ R×R`++×
R`++×]0,+∞[ by:
• ∇τ(t, x, p, w) =
(−1
0
)
,
• ∇gk(t, x, p, w) =
(
1
−∇uk(x)
)
for k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
• ∇gn+1(t, x, p, w) =
(
0
p
)
,
• D2τ(t, x, p, w) ≡ 0,
• D2gk(t, x, p, w) =
[
0 0
0 −D2uk(x)
]
for k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
• D2gn+1(t, x, p, w) ≡ 0.
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The function τ is linear, the constraint functions (gk)
n+1
k=1 are twice differen-
tiable and satisfy: ∇gk(t, x, p, w) 6= 0 for all k = 1, . . . , n+1 and (t, x, p, w) ∈
R×R`++×R`++×]0,+∞[. The first order conditions related to this problem
are: if (t, x) is a solution, there exists λ = (λk)1≤k≤n+1 ∈ Rn+1+ such that :
∇τ(t, x, p, w) +
n+1∑
k=1
λk∇gk(t, x, p, w) = 0
λkgk(t, x, p, w) = 0 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}
gk(t, x, p, w) ≤ 0 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}
(t, x, p, w) ∈ R× R`++ × R`++×]0,+∞[
(6.2)
Note that we have: {k ∈ {1, . . . , n}|gk(t, x, p, w) = 0} = M(x). Thus, the
multipliers λk are equal to zero for k /∈ M(x). From the above formula for
the gradients, these conditions can be rewritten as follows:
∑n
k=1 λk = 1
λk(t− uk(x)) = 0, k = 1, . . . , n
λn+1(p · x− w) = 0
t− uk(x) ≤ 0, k = 1, . . . , n
p · x− w ≤ 0
λn+1p =
∑
k∈M(x) λk∇uk(x)
(6.3)
First order conditions are necessary and sufficient. The first order conditions
are necessary because Mangasarian-Fromovitz condition for the qualification
of the constraints is satisfied everywhere. Indeed, for α > 0 large enough,
(−α,−1) · ∇gk(t, x, p, w) < 0 for all k = 1, . . . , n+ 1.
We now check that these conditions are sufficient. Let (t, x, λ) satisfy-
ing these conditions. By the first equation and the fact that the vectors
(∇uk(x))nk=1 and p are elements of R`++, we deduce that λn+1 is necessar-
ily positive, which implies that the budget constraint is binding. If (t, x) is
not a solution of 6.1, there exists (t′, x′) such that t′ > t, t′ ≤ uk(x′) for
k = 1, . . . , n and p · x′ ≤ w. Since uk is strictly quasi-concave with a non-
vanishing gradient, for all k ∈ M(x), one has t = uk(x) < t′ ≤ uk(x′), so
∇uk(x) · (x′ − x) > 0. Hence,
λn+1p · (x′ − x) =
 ∑
k∈M(x)
λk∇uk(x)
 · (x′ − x) > 0
which implies that p · x′ > p · x = w in contradiction with p · x′ ≤ w. So, the
first order conditions are sufficient.
In the next lemma, we prove that f(p, w) is a singleton and f is contin-
uous.
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Lemma 6.1 Under Assumptions 4, 5 and 6, f(p, w) is a singleton for all
p ∈ R`++ and w > 0. The function f is continuous on R`++×]0,+∞[.
Since the budget set is not closed, we need first to consider an intermediary
problem.
A ε-problem For ε > 0, f ε(p, w) is defined as the solution of the following
optimization problem: 
maxu(x)
subject to p · x ≤ w
xh ≥ ε , h = 1, . . . , `
(6.4)
We define the ε-budget set by:
Bε(p, w) := {x ∈ R`|xh ≥ ε, h = 1, . . . , `, p · x ≤ w}
Lemma 6.2 For every (p¯, w¯) ∈ R`++×]0,+∞[, there exist a number εˆ > 0
and a neighborhood Ξ of (p¯, w¯) such that, for all ε ∈]0, εˆ[, for all (p, w) ∈ Ξ,
the set f ε(p, w) is a singleton and the function f ε is continuous on Ξ.
Proof of Lemma 6.2 Let (p¯, w¯) ∈ R`++×]0,+∞[ and ε > 0 smaller than
εˆ :=
w¯
2
∑`
h=1 p¯h
. Such a choice implies that the interior of the set Bε(p, w) is
nonempty on a compact neighborhood Ξ of (p¯, w¯).
For all (p, w) ∈ Ξ, the set Bε(p, w) is a nonempty, compact and convex
set. Thus, by Weierstrass Theorem, the set f ε(p, w) is nonempty. By the
strict quasi-concavity of the function u22, the set f ε(p, w) is a singleton.
On Ξ, the interior of Bε(p, w) is nonempty. We now prove that the func-
tion (p, w) 7−→ f ε(p, w) is continuous on Ξ. This is a consequence of Berge’s
Theorem[3] since the correspondence Bε is both upper semi-continuous and
lower semi-continuous on Ξ.
On Ξ, the set Bε(p, w) remains in a fixed compact set K. Hence the upper
semi-continuity of Bε is equivalent to the closedness of its graph, which is a
consequence of the continuity of the budget constraint.
We now show that the correspondence Bε is lower semi-continuous. Let
us first introduce the correspondence Bˆε defined on Ξ by: Bˆε(p, w) := {x ∈
R`|p · x < w, xh > ε , h = 1, . . . , `}. The correspondence Bˆε has an open
graph by the continuity of the constraints. So Bˆε is lower semi-continuous.
Since Bˆε(p, w) is nonempty for every (p, w) ∈ Ξ and the closure of Bˆε(p, w)
is Bε(p, w), we deduce that the correspondence Bε is lower semi-continuous
22 Indeed a differentiably strictly quasi-concave function is strictly quasi-concave (See
Balasko[2]). And the minimum of strictly quasi-concave functions is strictly quasi-concave.
25
since the closure of a lower semi-continuous correspondence is lower semi-
continuous23.
Proof of Lemma 6.1. Since the function u is strictly quasi-concave and
the budget set is convex, f(p, w) contains at most one element.
First we show that for some ε¯ > 0, f ε¯(p, w) satisfies the first order condi-
tions characterizing f(p, w) for every (p, w) ∈ Ξ. We conclude that f(p, w)
is a singleton for every (p, w) ∈ R`++×]0,+∞[ and that f is continuous on
R`++×]0,+∞[. To use the first order conditions, we rewrite Problem 6.4 as we
did since the function u is not differentiable. For all (p, w) ∈ R`++×]0,+∞[,
f ε(p, w) is the solution of the following problem:
min−t
subject to
gk(t, x, p, w) ≤ 0 k = 1, . . . , n+ 1
ah(t, x, p, w) := ε− xh ≤ 0 h = 1, . . . , `
(6.5)
This problem is similar to Problem 6.1 except that there are ` additional
constraints, ε− xh ≤ 0, h = 1, . . . , `.
As before, the necessary first order conditions can be written: if (t, x) is
a solution of 6.5, there exists λε = (λεk)0≤k≤n+1 ∈ Rn+1+ and µε ∈ R`+ such
that : 
∑n
k=1 λ
ε
k = 1
λεk(t− uk(x)) = 0, k = 1, . . . , n
λεn+1(p · x− w) = 0
t− uk(x) ≤ 0, k = 1, . . . , n
p · x− w ≤ 0
µεh(ε− xh) = 0 , h = 1, . . . , `
ε− xh ≤ 0 , h = 1, . . . , `
λεn+1p =
∑
k∈M(x) λ
ε
k∇uk(x) + µε
(6.6)
Note that {k ∈ {1, . . . , n}|gk(t, x, p, w) = 0} = M(x). Thus, the multipliers
λεk are equal to zero for k /∈ M(x). Since λεn+1 6= 0, p · x = w and the choice
of ε small enough implies that at least one constraint ah¯ is not binding. The
first order conditions are necessary because Mangasarian-Fromovitz qualifi-
cation condition is satisfied everywhere. Indeed, for α > 0 large enough,
(−α,−1h¯) · ∇gk(t, x, p, w) < 0 for all k = 1, . . . , n + 1 24. The satiated
additional constraints are affine and we have: (−α,−1h¯) ·∇ah(t, x, p, w) = 0.
Our goal is to show that there exists ε¯ > 0 such that the multipliers related
to the constraints (ah)
`
h=1 are equal to zero for all (p, w) in Ξ. We reason by
23See the appendix of [16].
241h denotes the vector that all the components are equal to zero except the h−th one
that is equal to one.
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contradiction. Otherwise, there would exist a decreasing sequence25 (εq)q≥0
that converges to zero and a sequence of Ξ denoted by (pq, wq)q≥0 such that
µεq(pq, wq) 6= 0.
By compactness, we remark that the sequence (xq := f
εq(pq, wq))q≥0 con-
verges, up to a subsequence, to an element xˆ belonging to the boundary of
R`++ and that the sequence (pq, wq)q≥0 converges, up to a subsequence, to
some element (pˆ, wˆ) ∈ Ξ. In particular, remark that wˆ is positive and that
pˆ is different from zero. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote the con-
verging subsequences as the original sequences. We write, for q ∈ N and
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, αεqk :=
λ
εq
k
λ
εq
n+1
. We have, for all q ≥ 0,

pq · xq − wq = 0
pq =
n∑
k=1
α
εq
k ∇uk(xq) + µεq
µ
εq
h (εq − xqh) = 0 , h = 1, . . . , `
(6.7)
0 ≤ µεq ≤ pq implies that (µεq)q≥ 0 is a bounded sequence. Since all the
terms are non-negative in the second equation, for all q ∈ N, we have:
‖pq‖ ≥ αεqk ‖∇uk(xq)‖ ∀k ∈M(xq).
Hence:
0 ≤ αεqk
∇uk(xq) · xq
‖pq‖ ≤
∇uk(xq) · xq
‖∇uk(xq)‖ .
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and q ∈ N. From Assumption 6, we obtain, for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
lim
q−→+∞
∇uk(xq) · xq
‖∇uk(xq)‖ = 0.
So , for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
lim
q−→+∞
α
εq
k
∇uk(xq) · xq
‖pq‖ = 0.
Finally, from 6.7, µεq · xq = εqµεq · 1 = εq‖µεq‖ converges to zero. Hence,
summing the above limits,
pq · xq
‖pq‖ converges to zero which contradicts
pˆ · xˆ
‖pˆ‖ =
wˆ
‖pˆ‖ > 0.
25ε0 is supposed to be smaller than εˆ.
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Therefore, there exists ε¯ > 0 such that µε¯ = 0. Thus, f ε¯ satisfies the
necessary and sufficient conditions related to 6.5 for all (p, w) in Ξ. So f = f ε¯
on Ξ and the continuity of f follows.
The following lemma is a consequence of the result of Cornet and Vial[8].
Lemma 6.3 The function f is locally Lipschitz on R`++×]0; +∞[. Hence f
is almost everywhere differentiable on R`++×]0; +∞[.
Proof To show that the function f is locally Lipschitz, we check that As-
sumptions (A.0), (C.1) and (C.2) of Corollary 2.3. of [8] are satisfied.
Assumptions (A.0) are satisfied. We take U = R × R`++ and P =
R`++×]0,+∞[. The set U is open and obviously a metric space. So As-
sumption (A.0) (i) is satisfied. Assumptions (A.0) (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) are
satisfied because the functions are C2 on the set U × P . Assumption (A.0)
(vi) is satisfied with Q = C = −Rn+1+ .
Assumption (C.1) is satisfied. We show that, at a solution (t, x) of 6.1, the
vectors (∇gk(t, x, p, w))k∈M(x) and ∇gn+1(t, x, p, w) are linearly independent.
Let a vector
(
(γk)k∈M(x), γn+1
) ∈ R]M(x)+1 such that:∑
k∈M(x)
γk∇gk(t, x, p, w) + γn+1∇gn+1(t, x, p, w) = 0
We obtain: 
∑
k∈M(x) γk = 0
γn+1p =
∑
k∈M(x)
γk∇uk(x)
If γn+1 = 0, then γk = 0 for every k ∈ M(x) because the vectors
(∇uk(x))k∈M(x) are linearly independent by Assumption 5.
If γn+1 6= 0, we get by the first order conditions:∑
k∈M(x)
(
λk
λn+1
− γk
γn+1
)
∇uk(x) = 0.
So we have:
λk
λn+1
=
γk
γn+1
for every k ∈M(x) by Assumption 5. But we get
a contradiction since:
0 =
∑
k∈M(x)
γk
γn+1
=
∑
k∈M(x)
λk
λn+1
=
1
λn+1
> 0.
Assumption (C.2) is satisfied. Let (t, x) be a solution of 6.1 with a cor-
responding multiplier λ := (λk)
n+1
k=1 . Let us introduce the set K(x) := {k ∈
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M(x)|λk > 0}. We have to check that, for all h ∈ R`+1, h 6= 0 such that:
∇τ(t, x, p, w) · h = 0 and ∇gk(t, x, p, w) · h = 0 for k ∈ K(x) ∪ {n + 1}, we
have: D2τ(t, x, p, w) + ∑
k∈K(x)∪{n+1}
λkD
2gk(t, x, p, w)
h · h > 0.
Since we have : D2τ ≡ 0 and D2gn+1 ≡ 0. It remains to show that:∑
k∈K(x)
λkD
2gk(t, x, p, w)h · h > 0.
This reduces to:
−
∑
k∈K(x)
λkD
2uk(x)h´ · h´ > 0
where h´ is the vector of R` deduces from h by deleting the first component.
Since ∇τ(t, x, p, w) · h = 0 and ∇gk(t, x, p, w) · h = 0 for every k ∈ K(x) ∪
{n + 1}, one obtains h0 = 0 with the first equality and ∇uk(x) · h´ = 0 for
k ∈ K(x). So h´ 6= 0 and the inequality is then a consequence of Assumption
4.
From [8], the function f is locally Lipschitz on R`++×]0,+∞[ and by
Rademacher’s Theorem, the function f is almost everywhere differentiable.
The following lemma is a consequence of the Implicit Function Theorem
and its proof is quite standard borrowing ideas from Fiacco McCormick [15].
Lemma 6.4 If (p¯, w¯) ∈ Ω0, then the function f and the multipliers are
continuously differentiable on an open neighborhood N of (p¯, w¯). Moreover:
M [f(p, w)] = M [f(p¯, w¯)] for all (p, w) ∈ N . Consequently, Ω0 is an open
set.
Proof Recall that we have: ∀k ∈ M(f(p¯, w¯)), λk(p¯, w¯) > 0. In this proof,
we use the following notations: x¯ := f(p¯, w¯) and λ¯k := λk(p¯, w¯) for k ∈
{1, . . . , n}. To simplify the notation, without loss of generality, we sup-
pose that we have: M(f(p¯, w¯)) = {1, . . . , r}. Then, locally around (p¯, w¯),
by the continuity of the demand function and of the functions (uk)1≤k≤n,
(u(f(p, w), f(p, w)) is the solution of the following problem:
min−t
subject to
t− uk(x) ≤ 0, k ∈ {1, . . . , r}
p · x− w ≤ 0
x 0
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As already shown, since the first order optimality conditions are necessary
and sufficient, the element (u(f(p, w)), f(p, w)) and the related multipliers
(λ1(p, w), . . . , λr(p, w), λn+1(p, w)) are solution of G(t, x, λ, p, w) = 0 where
G is defined by:
G(t, x, λ, p, w) =

(
∑r
k=1 λk)− 1∑r
k=1 λk∇uk(x)− λn+1p
t− uk(x), k = 1, . . . , r
p · x− w
(6.8)
To show that the function f and the multipliers are continuously differen-
tiable on a neighborhood of (p¯, w¯), from the Implicit Function Theorem, it
suffices to show that A, the partial Jacobian matrix of G with respect to
(t, x, λ), has full column rank.
A :=

t x λ1 . . . λr λn+1
0 0 1 . . . 1 0
0
∑r
k=1 λ¯kD
2uk(x¯) ∇u1(x¯) . . . ∇ur(x¯) −p¯
1 −∇u1(x¯)T 0 . . . . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
1 −∇ur(x¯)T 0 . . . . . . 0
0 p¯T 0 . . . . . . 0

It is sufficient to prove that A
∆t∆x
∆λ
 = 0 implies: (∆t,∆x∆λ) = (0, 0, 0).
∆t is a real number, ∆x is a column vector of dimension ` and ∆λ is a column
vector of dimension r + 1.
We obtain the system:
r∑
k=1
∆λk = 0 (6.9)
r∑
k=1
[λ¯kD
2uk(x¯)∆x+ ∆λk∇uk(x¯)]−∆λn+1p¯ = 0 (6.10)
∆t−∆x · ∇uk(x¯) = 0 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , r} (6.11)
∆x · p¯ = 0 (6.12)
From Equations 6.11, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , r}, λ¯k∆t − λ¯k∆x · ∇uk(x¯) = 0.
Summing over k, we obtain:(
r∑
k=1
λ¯k
)
∆t−∆x ·
(
r∑
k=1
λ¯k∇uk(x¯)
)
= 0
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Since λ¯n+1p¯ =
∑r
k=1 λ¯k∇uk(x¯), we get:(
r∑
k=1
λ¯k
)
∆t−∆x · λ¯n+1p¯ = 0
From 6.12 and the fact that
∑r
=1 λ¯k = 1, we deduce: ∆t = 0. Thanks to
6.11,
∆x · ∇uk(x¯) = 0 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , r}
which implies p¯ ·∆x = 0 since λ¯n+1p¯ =
∑r
k=1 λ¯k∇uk(x¯) and λ¯n+1 > 0.
So if ∆x 6= 0, from Assumption 4,
∆x ·D2uk(x¯)∆x < 0 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , r}.
Doing an inner product of 6.10 by ∆x, we get:
r∑
k=1
λ¯k∆x ·D2uk(x¯)∆x+
r∑
k=1
(∆λk∇uk(x¯) ·∆x)−∆λn+1p¯ ·∆x = 0
which becomes:
r∑
k=1
λ¯k∆x ·D2uk(x¯)∆x = 0,
which is in contradiction with ∆x · D2uk(x¯)∆x < 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , r}
recalling that the multipliers λ¯k are all positive. Hence, we get ∆x = 0.
Since λ¯n+1p¯ =
∑r
k=1 λ¯k∇uk(x¯), 6.10 becomes:
r∑
k=1
(
∆λk − ∆λn+1
λ¯n+1
λ¯k
)
∇uk(x¯) = 0.
By Assumption 5, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , r}, ∆λk = ∆λn+1
λ¯n+1
λ¯k. From 6.9, we
have:
0 =
r∑
k=1
∆λk =
r∑
k=1
∆λn+1
λ¯n+1
λ¯k =
∆λn+1
λ¯n+1
.
So ∆λn+1 = 0 and finally, ∆λk = 0 for k = 1, . . . , r.
Proof of Lemma 3.2 We first recall that Dp∆(p¯, v¯) is the Hessian ma-
trix of the expenditure function eK(., v¯). Since the map eK(., v¯) is concave,
Dp∆(p¯, v¯) defines a symmetric negative semi-definite bilinear form.
For p ∈ R`++ sufficiently near from p¯ , ∆K(p, v¯) is characterized by the
first order conditions:
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• uk(∆K(p, v¯)) = v¯k, ∀k ∈ K,
• p =
∑
k∈K
µk(p)∇uk(∆K(p, v¯)) with µk(p) > 0 ∀k ∈ K.
We differentiate the first condition with respect to p and obtain at p¯ for all
q ∈ R`:
∇uk(∆K(p¯, v¯)) ·Dp∆K(p¯, v¯)(q) = ∇uk(x¯) ·Dp∆K(p¯, v¯)(q) = 0 ∀k ∈ K.
These equalities tell us that the image of Dp∆K(p¯, v¯) is contained in the
linear subspace ∩k∈K∇uk(x¯)⊥ of dimension ` − ]K26. Furthermore, since
Dp∆K(p¯, v¯) is negative semi-definite, ∇uk(x¯) belongs to its kernel for all
k ∈ K. Thus, the dimension of the image of Dp∆K(p¯, v¯) is at most `− ]K.
We differentiate the second condition with respect to p. We have for q ∈ R`:
q =
∑
k∈K
µk(p)D
2uk(∆K(p, v¯))Dp∆K(p, v¯)(q)+
∑
k∈K
(∇µk(p) ·q)∇uk(∆K(p, v¯)).
For all q ∈ ∩k∈K∇uk(x¯)⊥, we have:
q =
[∑
k∈K
µk(p¯)D
2uk(x¯)
]
Dp∆K(p¯, v¯)(q).
So we have for q ∈ ∩k∈K∇uk(x¯)⊥:
Dp∆K(p¯, v¯)(q) = 0 =⇒ q = 0.
So the kernel of the restriction on ∩k∈K∇uk(x¯)⊥ of Dp∆K(p¯, v¯) is reduced
to zero. So the rank of Dp∆K(p¯, v¯) is at least ` − ]K. Hence, the rank
of Dp∆K(p¯, v¯) is equal to ` − ]K and the kernel of Dp∆K(p¯, v¯) is equal to
L (∇uk(x¯) , k ∈ K).
Proof of Lemma 3.3 By Walras law, p · f¯K(p) = p · x¯.
Differentiating with respect to p, we obtain for all q ∈ R`:
q · f¯K(p) + p ·Df¯K(p)(q) = q · x¯ .
Since x¯ = f¯K(p¯), this implies: p¯ ·Df¯K(p¯)(q) = 0. Let k ∈ K. By the chain
rule: ∇vˆkK(p) · q = ∇uk(f¯K(p)) ·Df¯K(p)(q).
26 This is a consequence of Assumption 5. Indeed, K ⊂ M(x¯) implies that the family
(∇uk(x¯))k∈K is linearly independent.
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From the first order conditions of the utility maximization problem, we
have: ∑
k∈K
λ¯k∇uk(x¯) = λ¯n+1p¯ .
Recalling that f¯(p¯) = x¯, we have:∑
k∈K λ¯k∇vˆkK(p¯) · q =
(∑
k∈K λ¯k∇uk(x¯)
) ·Df¯K(p¯)(q)
= λ¯n+1p¯ ·Df¯K(p¯)(q) = 0
Since the equality is true for all q ∈ R`, we conclude that ∑k∈K λ¯k∇vˆkK(p¯) =
0. Recalling that the multipliers (λ¯k)k∈K are all positive and sum to 1,
since the functions (vˆkK)k∈K coincide on a neighborhood of p¯, one concludes
∇vˆkK(p¯) = 0 for all k ∈ K.
Now we prove the second result. Since f¯K(p) = ∆K(p, vˆK(p)) in an open
neighborhood of p¯, it suffices to use the chain rule for differential mappings
and the above claim to conclude. Indeed, let q ∈ R`,
Df¯K(p¯)(q) = Dp∆K(p¯, v¯)(q) +
(∑
k∈K
∇vˆkK(p¯) · q
)
Dv∆K(p¯, v¯).

Proposition 6.1 Let E be a vector space and Φ be a symmetric positive
definite bilinear form on E. Let (ξi)
k
i=1 be a linearly independent family of
vectors of E. There exists α ∈ Rk++ such that for all i = 1, . . . k,
Φ(ξi,
k∑
j=1
αjξj) > 0.
Let S be the simplex of Rk and C the subset of Rk defined by:
C = {(Φ(ξi,
k∑
j=1
αjξj))
k
i=1 | α ∈ S}.
Since Φ is bilinear, its restriction to the space generated by the family (ξi)
k
i=1
is continuous, so C is a nonempty compact polyhedral subset of Rk.
Let us first show that the conclusion of the proposition holds true if
C ∩Rk++ is nonempty. Indeed, if there exists c ∈ C ∩Rk++, then there exists
α ∈ S such that for all i, ci = Φ(ξi,
∑k
j=1 αjξj) > 0. Since Φ is continuous
on the space generated by the family (ξi)
k
i=1, there exists t > 0 small enough
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so that for all i, Φ(ξi,
∑k
j=1(αj + t)ξj) > 0, hence (αj + t)
k
j=1 ∈ Rk++ and the
conclusion of the proposition holds true.
We now prove by contraposition that C ∩ Rk++ is nonempty. If it is not
true, we apply a separation theorem between C and Rk++, so there exists an
element λ ∈ Rk \ {0} such that for (c, d) ∈ C × Rk++, λ · c ≤ λ · d. Using
usual arguments, one deduces that λ ∈ Rk+ and λ · c ≤ 0 for all c ∈ C. Let
α¯ = (1/
∑k
j=1 λj)λ. Then α¯ ∈ S. Let c¯ = (Φ(ξi,
∑k
j=1 α¯jξj))
k
i=1, then c¯ ∈ C.
We remark that:
λ · c¯ = ∑ki=1 λiΦ(ξi,∑kj=1 α¯jξj) = Φ(∑ki=1 λiξi,∑kj=1 α¯jξj)
= (1/
∑k
j=1 λj)Φ(
∑k
i=1 λiξi,
∑k
j=1 λjξj).
So Φ(
∑k
i=1 λiξi,
∑k
j=1 λjξj) ≤ 0 and since Φ is positive definite, this implies
that
∑k
j=1 λjξj = 0. Hence, since the family (ξi)
k
i=1 is linearly independent,
one concludes that λj = 0 for j = 1, . . . , k, which contradicts λ 6= 0.
References
[1] Balasko, Y.: Foundations of general equilibrium theory. Academic Press,
New York (1988)
[2] Balasko, Y.: General equilibrium: Theory of value. Princeton University
Press, Princeton (2011)
[3] Berge, C.: Espaces topologiques, fonctions multivoques. Dunod, Paris
(1966)
[4] Biheng, N.: A generalized expenditure function. Documents de travail du
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2014.83, Universite´ Paris 1 (2014)
[5] Bonnisseau, J.M., Rivera-Cayupi, J.: Constrained consumptions, Lips-
chitzian demands and regular economies. Journal of Optimization Theory
and Applications 131, 179-193 (2006)
[6] Carlier, G., Dana, R., Shahdi. N.: Efficient insurance contracts under
epsilon contaminated utilities. The Geneva Papers on risk and Insurance
Theory 28, 59-71 (2003)
[7] Chen, Z., Epstein, L.: Ambiguity, risk and asset returns in continuous
time. Econometrica 70, 1403-1443 (2002)
[8] Cornet, B., Vial, J.P.: Lipschitzian solutions of perturbed non linear
problems. SIAM Journal of control and optimization 24, 1123-1137 (1986)
34
[9] Dana, R.A.: Ambiguity, uncertainty aversion and equilibrium welfare.
Economic Theory 23, 569-587 (2004)
[10] Debreu, G.: Theory of Value. Yale University Press (1959)
[11] Debreu, G.: Economies with a finite set of equilibria. Econometrica 38,
387-392 (1970)
[12] Deimling, K.: Nonlinear functional analysis. Springer Verlag, Berlin Hei-
delberg (1985)
[13] Epstein, L., Wang, T.: Intertemporal asset pricing and Knightian un-
certainty. Econometrica 62, 283- 322 (1994)
[14] Federer, H.: Geometric measure theory. Grundlehren der mathematis-
chen Wissenschaften, Vol. 153. Springer Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg New
York (1969)
[15] Fiacco, A., McCormick, G.: Nonlinear programming: Sequential uncon-
strained minimization techniques. Classics in Applied Mathematics, Vol.
4. SIAM, Philadelphia (1990)
[16] Florenzano, M.: General equilibrium analysis: Existence and optimality
properties of equilibria. Kluwer Academic Publishers (2003)
[17] Gilboa, I., Schmeidler, D.: Maxmin expected utility with non-unique
prior. Journal of Mathematical Economics 18, 141-153 (1989)
[18] Karni, E.: Decision-making under Uncertainty: The Case of State-
Dependent Preferences. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1985)
[19] Karni, E., Schmeidler, D., Vind K.: On state dependent preferences and
subjective probabilities. Econometrica 51, 1021-1031 (1983)
[20] Kopylov. I.: Subjective probability and confidence. Mimeo, University
of California at Irvine, (2008)
[21] Magill, M., Quinzii, M.: Theory of Incomplete Markets. MIT Press,
Cambridge (1996)
[22] Mas-Colell, A.: The theory of general economic equilibrium: A differ-
entiable approach. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1985)
[23] Nishimura, K.G.,Ozaki, H.: Search and Knightian Uncertainty. Journal
of Economic Theory 119, 299-333 (2004)
35
[24] Nishimura, K.G.,Ozaki, H.: An axiomatic approach to ε-contamination.
Economic Theory 27, 303-340 (2006)
[25] Rader, R.: Nice demand functions. Econometrica 41, 913-935 (1973)
[26] Rigotti, L., Shannon, C.: Sharing risk and ambiguity. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 147, 2028-2039 (2012)
[27] Shannon, C.: Regular nonsmooth equations. Journal of Mathematical
Economics 23, 147-166 (1994)
[28] Schmeidler, D.: Subjective probability and expected utility without ad-
ditivity. Econometrica 57, 571-587 (1989)
[29] Shapley, L.S.: Core of a convex game. International Journal of Game
Theory 1, 12-26 (1989)
[30] Wakker, P.: Subjective probabilities for state-dependent continuous util-
ity. Mathematical Social Sciences 14, 289-298 (1987)
36
